2026-11-19
Honourable Speaker of the Seimas, honourable Members of the Seimas, honourable Minister of Finance,
Today we are not merely discussing next year’s budget. We are considering the state’s commitments for the next three years and whether the revenue with which we intend to finance them is sufficient, sustainable and realistic.
I would therefore like to provide clarity on two questions.
First question: Does the draft budget comply with the rules of fiscal discipline?
The answer is unequivocal – no. According to the assessment of the Independent Fiscal Institution (IFI), the draft does not comply with either national or European Union fiscal discipline rules. Net expenditure for 2026–2029 is set to rise by an average of 7.9% per year, while the average of the annual growth limits set out in the Fiscal Structural Plan is 4.7%.
This is not a margin of error of a few tenths of a percentage point. Expenditure is growing significantly faster than the sustainable trajectory set for Lithuania.
Secondly, in my view, an even more important question is: Does the draft budget itself reflect the full extent of the expected deficit?
In our view, it does not.
The IFI forecasts that the general government deficit could reach 3.5% of GDP in 2026, 5% in 2027, 5.8% in 2028, and 5.9% of GDP in 2029. By the end of the period, it would be almost double the 3% Maastricht threshold.
Why do our figures differ from those in the draft budget?
It is not because we are relying on a more pessimistic economic forecast. On the contrary. The IFI and the Government are basing their calculations on the same economic scenario from September.
The difference does not lie in the economic forecast. The difference lies in what we consider to be realistic revenue and government commitments.
I shall give some specific examples.
First – revenue.
The 2027 draft budget provides for €197 million in additional revenue from improved tax administration. We are not including this, because, as long as there are not enough specific and measurable means to substantiate such an effect, this is not revenue that can be relied upon to finance recurrent expenditure. If the administration manages to collect this money, that will be a positive outcome. However, it would be imprudent to use it to finance recurrent commitments at this stage.
Second example. The IFI for 2027–2029 forecasts a reduction in excise duty revenue of €100 million per year, as the Ministry of Finance’s own fiscal risk assessment rates the likelihood of halting or slowing the increase in the CO₂ component of diesel tax at the maximum – 10 out of 10.
Third example. The draft assumes that the investment corporation tax relief will end in 2028 and that approximately €200 million in additional revenue will be received in 2029. The IFI does not include this, as this relief has been extended every five years since 2009. If the government decides not to extend it further, additional revenue will be generated.
However, an even greater discrepancy arises on the expenditure side.
The 2027 draft does not include a number of highly probable expenditure items: aid to Ukraine, railway infrastructure and the impact of changes in the accounting treatment of some public-private partnership projects. If these revenue and expenditure risks were to materialise, the deficit in 2027 would increase by approximately 0.8% of GDP.
However, we see the main problem in 2028 and 2029.
Although we are approving a three-year budget, the draft does not provide for further increases in public sector wages, additional pension indexation, or the full statutory increase in the state contribution for persons insured at the state’s expense. As a result, the fiscal outlook appears better, but the state’s obligations do not disappear.
For example, the draft budget projects that public sector wage costs will rise by around 3% annually in 2028–2029, and that their ratio to GDP will decline. Taking into account the wage commitments already made, we consider such a decline to be unlikely. In 2029 alone, our forecast for wage expenditure differs from the draft by almost 1% of GDP.
In the area of health insurance, under the law already passed, state contributions for persons insured at the state’s expense are set to rise; however, the draft budget does not allocate sufficient funds for this. Consequently, the IFI is including an additional €137 million in 2028 and €413 million in 2029. This is not a forecast based on a new political decision. It is the financial consequence of a law that is already in force.
Another example is pensions. The draft budget currently provides for no additional indexation in 2028 and 2029. We are including additional indexation of the individual component, as this decision has been taken every year in recent years.
I would also like to draw attention to expenditure from borrowed funds that is not included in the appropriations. In recent years, these have ranged from several hundred million to around €1.3 billion per year. In 2027, the Ministry of Social Security and Labour also plans to spend nearly €326 million from borrowed funds. The National Audit Office considers this practice to be flawed and has been raising concerns about it since 2016, as it may weaken the Seimas’s budgetary oversight and complicate the management of fiscal risks. Such expenditure is not reflected in the budget, even though the right to borrow is enshrined in law. The budget should reflect the full extent of the financial commitments undertaken by the state.
It is therefore clear that we are not talking about a technical discrepancy in a few figures. We are talking about the Seimas making decisions based on a true and fair view of the state’s finances.
Compared with the draft budget, our assumptions increase the deficit by around 0.3% of GDP in 2026, 0.8% in 2027, 0.9% in 2028 and 1.7% of GDP in 2029. The gap is not narrowing but widening. And this does not yet take into account the impact on the deficit of the commitments disclosed by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour.
That is why 2029 is particularly important for us.
By then, the temporary defence spending clause will have expired. It allows Lithuania to deviate from its usual spending trajectory but does not generate a single additional euro in revenue. From 2026, the draft budget envisages utilising the full permitted scope of the 1.5% of GDP defence spending derogation. We must therefore use this time not to postpone decisions, but to prepare to fund defence sustainably.
If we fail to do so, our options later on will be considerably more limited and painful.
According to IFI calculations, in order for the deficit not to exceed 3% of GDP in 2029, it would need to be reduced by more than €3 billion.
This is no longer a minor adjustment. These are decisions concerning economic growth, government revenue, spending priorities and the scale of our commitments. Across the board. And the cost of these decisions increases the longer we delay them.
According to the IFI’s assessment, debt would approach 60% of GDP in 2029 and could exceed this threshold in 2030. If policy remains unchanged, debt could reach more than 74% of GDP by 2035. Interest payments, which will cost around €1 billion in 2026, could rise to around €2.1 billion per year by 2029.
That is 2% of GDP that we will be unable to use for defence, healthcare, education or investment.
Honourable Members of the Seimas,
Fiscal discipline is not a European formality, nor is it an end in itself. Its purpose is to ensure that the state can finance its commitments without passing on the cost of today’s decisions to future taxpayers.
Recognising that fiscal sustainability is no less important a commitment to society than commitments to expenditure, my message to the Seimas is very specific.
Firstly, we must acknowledge the true scale of the problem and, in the revised draft budget, disclose the likely deficit, taking into account the risks identified by the independent fiscal institution. This is all the more important given that the European Commission is also forecasting a higher deficit than that envisaged in the draft budget.
Secondly, the budget must reflect all commitments undertaken and set out targets for the next three years. Otherwise, the Seimas and the public will be presented with an overly optimistic picture of the three-year budget.
Thirdly, if it is not possible to present a draft budget that complies with the fiscal discipline rules, it is essential to provide a detailed and quantitatively substantiated plan setting out the measures to be taken and the timetable for returning to compliance. In the event of a deviation from the rules, measures to ensure compliance must be taken at the earliest possible opportunity, as a delayed correction could prove particularly painful. In order to comply with the net expenditure rule in 2028, a deviation of more than €3 billion in 2027 will need to be corrected. If expenditure continues to rise in defiance of the rules, this figure will increase further.
Sustainable defence funding, high-quality public services and fiscal discipline need not be at odds with one another.
Fiscal sustainability is a prerequisite for us to be able to fulfil all these state commitments not just next year, but in three, five or ten years’ time.
That is why decisions are needed not in 2029, but sooner.
The longer we delay decisions on revenue and expenditure, the greater the risk that we will later have to take them more hastily and with greater pain. I believe that the choices you make today can help ensure that this burden on our society is lighter.
Thank you. And I wish you every success in making the right decisions!